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Overview 
 
This submission has been prepared in response to the Ministry of Economic 
Development discussion document Regulatory Implications of Structural Separation
1
, 
where comment is sought on the implications of a possible voluntary structural 
separation of Telecom for the current regulatory and policy settings.   
 
The discussion document has requested that submissions follow its own structure, 
and respond directly to questions on which views are sought.  We have complied 
with this request, in the material contained in Part B below.   
 
However, it is our firmly-held view that the exercise of reviewing existing regulation 
as a consequence of the possible structural separation of Telecom must give due 
regard to the fact that Telecom‟s options are themselves the consequence of 
fundamental changes in the Telecommunications environment – arising from both 
technological change a fundamental shift in government policy in the sector as plans 
are put in place tor investment in the Ultra Fast Broadband initiative (UFBI).  These 
changes have profound implications for the development of both regulatory policy 
and the entire telecommunications industry in New Zealand, aside from the specific 
consequences of Telecom‟s structural choices  If the current review is to provide a 
forward-looking set of regulatory policies and directions to cope with these 
fundamental changes, we cannot to provide meaningful and coherent critical 
comment without taking them into account.  
 
Consequently, we have taken the liberty of including an introductory section, Part A, 
where we lay out the background and context in which the regulatory review is being 
carried out, and explain the framework that has guided our thinking in analysing the 
issues raised in the discussion document, and which forms the basis for our 
discussion of the individual points addressed in Part B.  Part A assists by providing 
further clarity regarding our responses in Part B. 
 
In the spirit of open communication and debate about the very important policy and 
regulatory issues addressed in both the discussion document and our submission, 
we are happy to provide any further information or clarification that may be required.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Ministry of Economic Development (2010). Discussion Document: Regulatory Implications of Structural 
Separation. September 2010. Retrieved from: 
http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/74850/Regulatory%20Implications%20Of%20Structural%20Separation%2
0-%20September%202010.pdf.  
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Part A: Background 
 
Regulation best promotes the long-term interests of the welfare of citizens (economic 
efficiency) when it eliminates or ameliorates the consequences of market 
inefficiencies.   
A.1 Rationale for Regulation2 
As a starting point for contemplating the appropriate regulatory response 3 to the 
proposed voluntary structural separation of any telecommunications provider whose 
market dominance has resulted in it being historically subject to regulation, it is 
apposite to consider: 
 the objectives of, and justifications for, imposing regulation;  
 the subject of regulatory intervention; and 
 the ways in which the regulatory instruments applied alter activities in the 
subject entities in order to further achievement of the objectives that  justify 
intervention in the first place.  
 
The most common reason for regulatory intervention is to correct for market 
inefficiencies. Market inefficiencies arise from a number of reasons, including 
monopoly power, externalities and various forms of opportunistic behaviour
4
.  Policy-
makers impose regulations that avert the foreseeable consequences of market 
inefficiencies in order to promote or protect the public welfare.  Most economists 
argue that the public welfare is best promoted by the pursuit of economic efficiency – 
total welfare, defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus – in both its 
static and dynamic forms, and across both productive and allocative dimensions
5
.  
 
Thus, regulators seek to maximise economic efficiency by eliminating or ameliorating 
market inefficiencies.  Intervention is justified because, without it, the subject market 
will perform less efficiently than if the intervention is applied. The performance of a 
chosen regulation will be measured by the extent to which total welfare is increased 
                                                     
2 The material in this section draws largely from : 
Chapter 20 of Carlton, D. & Perloff, J. (2005). Modern Industrial Organization. 4th ed. Boston, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley; 
Melody, W. (2005). Regulation and network investment: a framework for analysis.  Chapter 1 in Mahan, Amy K. & 
William H. Melody (eds) Stimulating Investment in Network Development: Roles for Regulators pp 19-38.  Lyngby, 
Denmark: WDR Project, LIRNE.NET;  
Melody, W. (2002). Building the Regulatory Foundation for Growth in Network Economies. Discussion paper 0201, 
World Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies, managed by LIRNE.NET.  
3 As opposed to the alternative hypotheses that intervention is primarily for the opportunistic purpose of expanding 
either the extent of the regulator‟s powers or the vested interests of other powerful groups („capture theory‟), or to 
redistribute resources within the industry to satisfy other objectives, at the expense of economic efficiency.  
4 Opportunistic behaviour often arises because of asymmetric distribution of information or because the bounded 
rationality of human actors means that all possible future outcomes cannot be perfectly foreseen, and hence 
contingencies to allocate the all consequent costs and benefits efficiently cannot be devised ex ante. 
5
 Although it is acknowledged that a small minority holds that the primary purpose of regulation is to 
redistribute wealth amongst market participants.   
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in the subject market, relative to the counterfactual of no intervention. Whilst the 
means chosen may address the activities of a specific firm (e.g. one which has 
exerted market power to the detriment of economic efficiency), or the ways in which 
firms in a market are able to strike contracts to use specific infrastructures (e.g. 
elements of a legacy telecommunications network exhibiting bottleneck 
characteristics) in order to create products and services to sell to consumers, the 
end remains improved economic efficiency in a given market.   
 
Markets are dynamic institutions where buyers (consumers) and sellers (producers) 
interact in response to their own incentives to increase individual welfare. They are 
open, complex systems, whereby interactions within the market evolve across time 
(for example as a consequence of internal learning by the participants as they 
interact with each other, so reducing information asymmetries), and where external 
shocks (for example, technological change or regulatory intervention) alter any or all 
of the methods of production, the relationships between the transactors, the 
institutions via which they organise production and transacting activities or the 
allocation of resources within the market.  In turn, both regulatory intervention and 
technological change evolve over time as both responses to, and means to influence 
the activities of, markets. The interactions across the boundaries of each open 
system are themselves a consequence of the endeavours of the participants in those 
systems to improve their own positions.   
 
Figure 1: Telecommunications: the Interactions of Complex Systems
6
 
 
                                                     
6 Source: Melody (2002) op. cit p 9.  
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Figure 1 illustrates the systemic interaction between markets, technologies and 
policies (including regulatory policies).  To the extent that optimal regulation seeks to 
ameliorate the effects of market inefficiencies and thereby increase economic 
efficiency in a market, its effectiveness is itself influenced by technological change 
and the changes in activities within the market that are influenced by it.  By 
extension, regulation itself must also constantly evolve in response to those changes.  
Regulation that is optimal under one set of technological circumstances and market 
interactions may not be optimal under a different set of circumstances and 
interactions.  Furthermore, regulatory intervention that alters the interaction 
(evolution) in a market may itself also affect the nature of technological innovation 
and change. What may appear optimal in the narrow frame of a market in one time 
period may not be optimal when taken in a dynamic frame across the wider system 
incorporating all of technologies, markets and the regulatory policy environment. 
Sound regulatory policy must take the wider context into account with every specific 
intervention. 
 
A.2 Application to the Current Proposals 
Whilst the preceding rationale might appear self-evident, it provides a useful 
framework against which to evaluate the regulatory and policy response to the 
possible future structural separation of Telecom New Zealand.  We consider first the 
context in which the regulatory changes are proposed, by examining the existing 
regulatory framework and the justifications (both economic-efficiency related and 
otherwise) for their adoption.  We then examine the specific motivations for 
reviewing the current regulatory provisions – arising form changes to both the 
technological and policy environments – and then discuss the implications for those 
regulatory arrangements that arise as a consequence of both the current regulatory 
context and the motivations for changes.   
 
A.3 Context 
(a) The New Zealand fixed line telecommunications market has been historically 
subject to regulatory intervention as a consequence of market inefficiencies 
arising as a consequence of a single firm (Telecom New Zealand) having 
significant market power arising from its ownership of the only nationwide 
fixed-line Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and the copper local 
loop providing fixed line telecommunications access to the vast majority of 
New Zealand homes and businesses.  Regulatory interventions have 
included
7
: 
 
                                                     
7
 For further comments on these interventions see Part C. 
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i. A universal service obligation equalising rural and urban residential 
telephone rentals, a cap on residential retail prices and a mandatory 
„free local calling‟ residential tariff, imposed in 1990 (the „Kiwi Share‟).   
ii. Access regulation and regulated interconnection to the fixed line 
network, imposed in 2001.  
iii. Bitstream unbundling, imposed in 2003.  
iv. Full local loop unbundling (LLU), imposed in 2006.   
v. Functional separation, imposed in 2007, separating Telecom New 
Zealand into a network operation arm (Chorus), a wholesale operation 
(Telecom Wholesale) and a retail operation (Telecom Retail). 
 
Whilst justifications based on at least some elements of economic efficiency 
were offered in support of the regulations in ii and iii, the efficiency rationale 
for the others remains at least partially obscure.  This is especially true for 
item v. Separation (either functional or structural) is typically imposed for the 
specific purpose of precluding a vertically integrated firm subject to access 
regulation (of which unbundled bitstream and LLU are variants) from 
engaging in discriminatory practices in favour of its own retail arm to the 
detriment of competing retail firms relying upon the regulated firm for access 
to essential network services
8
. Mandatory separation requires the firm to 
create an independent retail operation that buys services on equivalent terms 
and conditions to its access-based competitors.  If the regulated firm is truly 
engaging in discriminatory practices, and does manage a true bottleneck 
infrastructure for which there are no full or partial substitutes, then the 
additional institutional costs imposed by separation may be exceeded by 
gains from the elimination of discriminatory practices
9
.  However, if full or 
partial substitutes exist, or the network firm must upgrade its infrastructure to 
a new generation (frontier) technology, separation reduces efficiency by 
imposing unnecessary costs and interfering with the optimal substitution of 
customers from one network to another
10
. 
 
By contrast, a firm will voluntarily opt to separate into distinct entities when, 
taking all other external (market, technology, policy) factors into account, the 
long term expected returns for each of the separated entities are together 
                                                     
8
 Cave, M. (2006). Six degrees of separation: operational separation as a remedy in European 
telecommunications regulation.  Communications and Strategies 64: 89-103.  
9
 Albeit that de Bijl (2005) cautions that a careful empirical analysis is necessary to ascertain that this is 
indeed the case. de Bijl, P. (2005). Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets. Journal 
of Network industries 6(2): 95-114.  
10
 Heatley, D. & Howell, B. (2010a). Structural Separation and Prospects for Welfare-Enhancing Price 
Discrimination in a New ‘Natural Monopoly’ Network: comparing fibre broadband proposals in Australia 
and New Zealand. Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and 
Regulation. 26 June. Available from http://www.iscr.org.nz/n580.html. 
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greater than the returns expected from the non-separated state
11
.  It is noted 
that the counterfactual for Telecom‟s proposed structural separation in the 
current discussion is the current set of functionally separate entities and the 
regulatory regime under which they operate.   
 
(b) Technological change has resulted in the evolution of two distinctly different 
product markets which are now subject to regulation: narrowband services 
capable of delivering a narrow range of specific voice telephony, fax and dial-
up internet services using an exchange-based PSTN, and generic broadband 
services, over which a vast range of internet protocol applications (including 
voice services) can be offered.  Both types of products can use the local 
copper loop as the „last mile‟ of distribution. 
 
(c) Technological change has led to the development of ever-more capable 
networks for the distribution of the data used in internet applications.  These 
developments have occurred in both the enhancement of the capabilities of 
the existing copper-based access networks and the creation of fibre-optic 
networks.  Fibre has increasingly been deployed by the owners of copper 
access networks as part of the enhancements to their performance.  
Consequently, copper networks are being transformed by the deployment of 
fibre closer and closer to the end consumer, to the extent that modern Next 
Generation Networks (NGN) and full fibre-optic „Fibre to the Home‟ (FTTH) 
networks connecting to end consumers are largely identical in all „back room‟ 
network technologies.  They differ only in the technologies used to connect 
the „last mile‟ to the end consumer.  In 2007, Telecom entered into an 
undertaking with the Government to deploy a fibre-based (internet protocol, 
packet-swtiched) NGN covering most of the country by 2011.   
 
(d) Technological change has led to a pattern of convergence whereby a large 
variety of applications previously delivered over customised networks are 
increasingly being converted into a common (digital) format enabling their 
delivery over broadband networks.  Contemporaneously, the technologies 
capable of delivering broadband services have increased in capability, to the 
extent that for most purposes, broadband services capable of supporting the 
new wide array of applications can be delivered equally well over the „last 
mile‟ to end consumers by co-axial cable, satellite, wireless, mobile, fibre-
optic cable and satellite technologies, as well as copper loops.  In the New 
Zealand context, broadband access capable of supporting the vast majority of 
commonly used residential, and many commercial, applications is available 
                                                     
11
 Howell, B., Meade, R. & O‟Connor, S. (2010). Structural separation versus vertical integration: lessons 
for telecommunications from electricity reforms. Telecommunications Policy 34(7): 392-402.  
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nationwide over satellite, copper and, increasingly, mobile networks
12
.  Fibre, 
wireless and cable networks also compete with copper, satellite and mobile 
networks in many locations. International evidence shows that the fastest-
growing segment of the market, in respect of both connections and revenues, 
is mobile broadband, with a significant number of households opting to have 
no fixed line connections as the quality of mobile broadband services 
improves
13
. Figure 2 confirms the growth of mobile and wireless internet 
connections in Australia – a pattern very likely to be replicated in New 
Zealand. It would be unsurprising if the growth of mobile broadband access 
did not have a material effect upon fixed line broadband access, and hence 
the appropriateness of existing regulations governing the fixed line market. .  
 
 
Figure 1. Australian internet subscribers14.  
A.4 Motivation 
The possibility that Telecom New Zealand might elect to structurally separate has 
occurred as a consequence of changes in both the technological and policy 
subsystems of its environment.  
 
                                                     
12
 Glass, H. (2010). Presentation to the 1
st
 Asia-Pacific Regional Conference of the International 
Telecommunications Society, Wellington, New Zealand, August 28, 2010.  
13
 Levin, S. (2010). Issues for Universal Service and Net Neutrality in a Broadband Environment.  Paper 
presented to the 1
st
 Asia-Pacific Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, 
Wellington, New Zealand, August 26, 2010.  
14
 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2010). 8153.0 Internet Activity, Australia, June 2010. Retrieved 
September 22, 2010 from: 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/8153.0Main+Features1Jun%202010?OpenDocument. 
Notes: (a) For ISPs with more than 1,000 active subscribers. (b) Prior to December 2008, 'Other' includes 
satellite, cable and fibre.  
 -- 9 -- 
(a) Technological change has led to the development fibre-to-the-premises 
(FTTP) technologies capable of providing faster and more capacious internet 
access („frontier technology‟).  FTTH networks can act as a substitute for 
fixed broadband connections provided historically by fixed-line copper 
telecommunications providers. It is generally considered that, over the 
fullness of time, as a consequence of its superior technical characteristics 
FTTP will replace copper-based networks as the predominant last-mile fixed 
network technology. However, at the current point time, it is far from clear that 
sufficient demand exists for applications that can only operate on FTTH 
networks to justify a total substitution, given the high costs of building the 
FTTH networks
15
.   
 
(b) Policy change has arisen with New Zealand Government‟s UFB initiative to 
subsidise investment in local FTTP networks constructed by and operated in 
conjunction with private sector partners.  The precondition for firms partnering 
with the government in this project is that they cannot be substantially owned 
or controlled by firms operating in retail broadband markets
16
.  Telecom New 
Zealand, via its network operation arm Chorus, will be unable to participate in 
the government-planned network unless it structurally separates.  
 
A.5 Implications 
Telecom‟s possible structural separation is a direct response to both technological 
and policy changes.  If the consequent regulatory response is consistent with the 
objective of pursuing economic efficiency in the telecommunications market, then 
that response MUST, as a matter of principle, take direct account of its likely 
anticipated effects when the appropriate interventions are designed.  It is 
inappropriate to progress to regulatory change without first revisiting existing 
regulations, understanding all of the underpinning assumptions under which they 
were imposed, and assessing their ongoing efficacy in the pursuit of economic 
efficiency in the new environment engendered by all of the externally-imposed 
technological and policy changes and the market responses engendered.  To the 
extent that specific historic regulatory tools remain in the revised regulatory 
framework, it must be because they enhance the pursuit of economic efficiency in 
their own right in the current and future anticipated environments, rather than being 
retained as artefacts addressing historic (and potentially now  irrelevant) market 
imperfections. 
                                                     
15
 Howell, B. & Grimes, A. (2010). Productivity questions for public sector fast fibre network financiers.  
Communications and Strategies 78: 127-45.  
16
 While telecommunications retailers would not prevented from having a substantial equity interest in a 
local fibre company (LFC), they are prevented from having effective control of an LFC. Such limitations 
on control are presumed to make equity investment sufficiently unattractive to retailers to effectively 
preclude their involvement. 
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Specifically: 
 
(a) Access regulation to induce services-based competition has been presumed 
efficiency-raising only insofar as facilities-based competition between different 
infrastructures did not exist, and could not reasonably be anticipated to 
develop in the foreseeable future
17
.  Classical economic theory posits that 
direct infrastructure competition will be more effective than access regulation 
as it imposes competitive pressures on the provision of both the underlying 
network infrastructure (type and quality – e.g. speed) and the overlaid non-
bottleneck services.  Access regulation and the „ladder of investment‟ (LOI) 
model are a quasi-competitive second best
18
: access regulation addresses 
market inefficiencies in the overlaid (downstream) services, whilst the LOI 
acts as a „stepping stone‟ to full infrastructure competition, by enabling 
access-based competitors to gradually invest in elements of network 
provision to the extent that they would eventually own all relevant network 
elements and become full infrastructure competitors to the incumbent.   
 
(b) Insofar as the government chooses to partner with any party other than 
Telecom for the deployment of the fibre network access infrastructure (FTTH) 
in specific geographic markets, facilities-based fixed line broadband 
competition will be delivered directly into the New Zealand market without any 
further recourse to the access-based ladder model.  
 
(c) A second fixed-line infrastructure connected to end-consumers means that 
copper local loops are no longer a fixed-line „access bottleneck‟ for the 
provision of (wholesale or retail) broadband network access services
19
. 
Retailers (including the structurally- or functionally-separated Telecom 
operation) in those geographic markets where both Chorus and UFB provide 
services can choose the network over which to deliver applications to end 
consumers. Chorus‟s dominance in the supply of last-mile services will 
extend in these dual-serviced markets only insofar as it retains either an 
absolute cost advantage over the competing FTTH infrastructure for the 
provision of access services of equivalent quality or is the sole provider of a 
service that is inherently unable to be replicated over alternate 
                                                     
17
 “Facilities-based competition is viewed by OECD countries as important to ensure durable and effective 
competition in the telecommunications market.” OECD (2005). Communications Outlook 2005.  p 32.  
18
 Cave. M. (2006). Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment. 
Telecommunications Policy 30(3-4): 223-37.   
19
 Albeit that it is debatable that such a bottleneck continued to exist in any area where direct fixed line 
competition existed (e.g. from the cable network in Wellington and Christchurch, or from technologies 
such as satellite, wireless and mobile). The key remaining distinction is that downstream retailers with no 
independent network ownership are able to acquire customers as a consequence regulation to Telecom‟s 
local access network alone.   
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infrastructure(s) – either fixed or mobile. As FTTH is inherently more capable 
than copper, it is highly unlikely that the second scenario will emerge.  Indeed, 
if performance characteristics result in overwhelming consumer preference 
for FTTH, then not only is the copper network no longer a bottleneck – its 
owner is no longer the dominant firm in the market, so cannot be contributing 
materially to any significant market imperfections warranting regulatory 
amelioration.   
 
(d) Together, points (a) to (c) call into question the rationale for persisting with 
regulation predicated upon the promotion of services-based competition (i.e. 
access regulation) in those areas where facilities-based competition exists. It 
also begs the question of why ongoing investment on the legacy copper 
network by either the existing owner of access-based market entrants should 
be a focus of regulatory intervention at all.  When taking into account the 
supposed superiority of the fibre network and the implicit assumption that it 
will ultimately supersede the copper-based network and become the new 
bottleneck fixed-line access infrastructure
20
, such regulation appears 
superfluous. This line of thinking also highlights a very confused position 
across both the UFB and copper network regulatory policies regarding who 
may invest in different infrastructure types, should access regulation remain 
for the legacy copper network.  Whilst ongoing access regulation means 
Telecom‟s retail competitors are enabled (even incentivised?) to invest in 
elements of elements of Telecom‟s network infrastructure in order to compete 
and „climb the ladder‟ to ultimate competing legacy (copper) network 
ownership, they are simultaneously precluded from investing to the extent of 
taking a controlling ownership stake in the competing frontier fibre 
infrastructure, which presumably they will also be encouraged (even 
incentivised?) to purchase elements of with which to deliver services to their 
end consumers, and which would be the logical differentiated fixed line 
network technology that it might be expected a successful ladder-climber 
could progress to owning, were it not for the government‟s own intervention 
by specifying and part-funding the UFB.   
   
(e) Structurally separate retailers with negligible infrastructure investments have 
emerged in access-regulated telecommunications markets principally 
because the regulation itself has created and continues to uphold the viability 
of their business case.  In the event of access regulation becoming redundant 
(e.g. in the presence of facilities-based competition), then it is an 
                                                     
20
 Indeed, this assumption is implicit in the fact that the UFB policy already specifies that FTTH must be a 
structurally separate, open access network - long before it has even been invested in, let alone achieved the 
dominance that is usually necessary to warrant such intervention (unless, of course, it is presumed that, as 
with merger applications, an ex ante specification of this type will militate against both the acquisition and 
exertion of dominance).  
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inappropriate use of regulatory powers to support their ongoing existence.  If 
there is a valid business case for their survival on efficiency grounds (e.g. as 
distributors) then they will survive as it suits the infrastructure owner for them 
to do so. If not, then it is most efficient to let them fail.  It is noted that even 
the „ladder of investment‟ does not presume that separate retailers will endure, 
as they are presumed to „climb the ladder‟ to become fully vertically 
integrated infrastructure competitors to the incumbent
21
.  
 
(f) Where it has been imposed, regulated separation of network and retail 
operations in both copper and fibre networks has been a matter of regulatory 
choice, and imposed asymmetrically upon an access-regulated network 
which is presumed to have both market power and the proclivity to use the 
shield of vertical integration to discriminate in favour of its own downstream 
operations. It is not clear from either theoretical or empirical analysis that 
separation will on balance lead to increased economic efficiency in the long 
run.  Indeed, it militates directly against the efficient acquisition of scale when 
imposed upon a nascent network, so is highly unlikely to be the structure of 
choice for investors in new networks except under very limited 
circumstances
22
.  However, separation mandates do facilitate the regulatory 
enforcement process, by providing transaction transparency and 
comparability across the network-wholesaler and wholesaler-retailer 
boundaries.  By using separation mandates to predetermine industry (market) 
structure, conduct can be more easily observed and (if necessary) regulated, 
to the extent that the (constrained) performance of the industry (market) can 
be verified (and is arguably more easily controlled).  However, if applied when 
they should not, such mandates also preclude the natural evolution of the 
industry (market) to a more efficient set of structures.  Market participants 
respond to the regulations by generating an entirely different set of path-
dependent interactions than would have been the case otherwise.      
 
In summary, the discussion in Part A provides a background upon which our 
response to the questions in the discussion document is based.  
  
                                                     
21
 Even though the incumbent might itself be subject to separation mandates that preclude functional 
integration of retail and network operations.   
22
 Howell, B. (2010). Politics and the Pursuit of Telecommunications Sector Efficiency in New Zealand. 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 6 2. pp.253-376; Heatley , D, & Howell, B. (2010). Structural 
separation and prospects for welfare-enhancing price discrimination in a new natural monopoly: 
comparing fibre broadband proposals in Australia and New Zealand. 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f580,16593/16593_Efficiency-raising_price_discrimination_with_postscript_.pdf  
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Part B: Responses to the Discussion Document 
 
We now turn to the specific issues raised in the discussion document. In accordance 
with the directions, we structure this section according to the structure of the 
discussion document.  Rather than addressing all questions, we confine our 
discussion to those issues directly relevant to the points raised in Part A.  
1. Introduction 
 
Paragraph 4 states that the discussion paper 
 “makes no assumption on the outcome of the UFB process”   
and 
“considers the implications of the structural separation of Telecom for the 
current regulatory and policy settings. These issues are ones that would arise 
if Telecom were to structurally separate, irrespective of whether it is a 
successful UFB bidder.” 
 
Part A identifies that it is impossible to adequately assess the “implications of the 
structural separation of Telecom for the current regulatory and policy settings” in 
isolation from either: the objectives of and justifications for existing regulations and 
policies; or the extent to which Telecom‟s option to structurally separate is a direct 
response to those regulations and policies.    
    
Telecom‟s motivation to consider structural separation is directly a consequence of 
the Government‟s UFB policy – which is itself a direct response to technological 
change (the development of fibre technologies) and policy intervention to address a 
perceived market inefficiency (to the extent that the government‟s investment is in 
part to address the fact that the private sector has so far failed to invest in a FTTH 
network of the nature specified by the government at the speed the government 
would prefer).  Separation is proposed specifically so that Telecom CAN potentially 
participate as a UFB partner with the Government in the deployment of its network.   
 
Moreover, the September 9 announcement that Telecom has not been chosen by 
Crown Fibre Holdings as the preferred UFB partner for territories covering up to 18% 
of the population
23
 has clarified that in at least some geographic markets, Telecom 
will not be a partner, but will in fact be facing direct infrastructure competition from 
the UFB network, at least in the short-to-medium term
24
. (Given that Telstra‟s cable 
                                                     
23
http://www.crownfibre.govt.nz/news/press-releases/cfh-announces-shortlist-and-negotiations-for-first-
stage-roll-out-of-ufb.aspx  
24
 It is noted that under the Commerce Act 1986, any agreement between Telecom and the Government‟s 
preferred UFB partner in these regions in order to co-ordinate a smooth transition from copper connections 
to fibre connections would likely be in breach of the provisions in Sections 27 and 28 precluding the 
entering into of contracts, covenants, arrangements or understandings that substantially lessen competition.  
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network covers approximately 11% of the population, this announcement means that 
in the foreseeable future, fixed-line infrastructure competition will be a reality for a 
minimum of 29% of the population.) 
 
As UFB decisions so materially affect the nature of competition in a market that has 
historically been regulated on the assumption that the incumbent has enduring 
market dominance as a consequence of its ownership of a bottleneck infrastructure 
for which there is no likely close substitute, it is naïve (and arguably irresponsible) to 
proceed with an analysis of regulatory and policy implications that abstracts the 
causal stimulus of inevitable structural rearrangement of the entire industry out of the 
consideration.  The issues are manifestly not the same for the current review of 
regulatory and policy settings irrespective of whether Telecom is a successful UFB 
bidder.  Indeed, we contend that the more apposite consideration is rather of the 
implications for regulation and policy that arise if a structurally separate Chorus2 
owning the existing copper network assets were (or were not) a successful UFB 
bidder in specific regions.   
 
We note also that the current review of the regulatory environment must also take 
into account the changes to government policy covered by the Rural Broadband 
Initiative (RBI)
25
, to the extent that it is not certain that Telecom, or its copper 
network, will continue to be the infrastructure chosen to receive subsidies for the 
provision of services in commercially unviable areas.  
 
Consequently, our submission takes the approach that the issues associated with 
the structural separation of Telecom are not independent of either the UFB bidding 
outcome or RBI decisions. 
 
1.1 Policy principles  
 
(7) The Ministry considers that any changes to the telecommunications regulatory 
regime should be consistent with the following policy principles: [numbered for our 
reference purposes] 
(i) promotion of competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term 
benefit of end-users of telecommunications services within New Zealand;  
(ii) incentivising efficient investment in telecommunications infrastructure and 
service development by access providers and access seekers;  
(iii) allowing consumers to choose between technology platforms on the basis 
of relative price and performance;  
(iv) minimising the compliance costs and competitive distortions of any 
regulatory intervention;  
(v) ensuring a sustainable industry structure;  
                                                     
25
 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____41997.aspx  
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(vi) providing sufficient certainty to the industry and ensuring that transitional 
measures minimise any market or investment disruption; and  
(vii) only introducing regulation where there is clear evidence of market failure 
and there are no non-regulatory options which will effectively address the 
issue.  
 
 
Part A outlines the case for the primary criterion for assessing the efficacy of the 
policy principles being the extent to which they further the pursuit of increased 
economic efficiency, in all of its dimensions. This leads us to the following 
conclusions in response to question 1 (in bold).   
 
(a) It is our view that principle (v) as it is currently worded is an 
inappropriate objective for regulatory policy, and that it should be 
replaced with the objective of  
(v) ensuring a sustainable industry;  
 
While the difference may appear subtle, its importance is crucial.  
 
In an environment of rapid changes in technology and consumer preferences, it is far 
from clear that a stable (i.e. relatively unchanging) industry structure will lead to the 
most efficient outcome in the long run. Whilst in a static technological environment it 
may be possible to identify a particular stable industry structure that leads to 
predictable interactions between industry participants („conduct‟) that deliver desired 
(most efficient) market outcomes („performance‟) 26 , in a dynamic context where 
technological change alters the products transacted, the relative costs and values 
placed upon them by producers and consumers, the methods of their production and 
the nature of the transactions by which they are exchanged, it is almost inevitable 
that the industry structures that best support the most efficient structural 
arrangement
27
 of the industry will differ from those supporting the historic production 
and transaction processes.  
                                                     
26
 The application of models based on the „Structure-Conduct-Performance‟ view for analysing industries 
has been criticised for its historic reliance upon measures of static efficiency. The failure of these models to 
take dynamic efficiency into account  has led to the development of a new set of dynamic models using 
tools such as game theory and the sciences of decision-making under uncertainty (Carlton & Perloff, 2005: 
Chapter 8).  For a discussion of the application of these models to the regulation of infrastructure, see 
Guthrie Guthrie, G. (2006). Regulating infrastructure: The impact on risk and investment. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 44(4), 925-972. 
27
 We take the Transaction Cost Economics and New Institutional Economics view that the structural 
arrangement of the industry comprises the organisation of transacting parties across the entire value chain 
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Regulation can be used to impose a stable industry structure that can prevail despite 
the pressures of dynamic technological change. Indeed, industry participants may 
prefer such stability, especially if it insulates their current (economically viable) 
position against the threats and uncertainties embodied in technologically-driven 
structural change.  
 
However, if the regulated structure prevents the industry from evolving in response 
to technological or customer preference changes in a manner that would result in 
increased economic efficiency, then structural stability is inappropriate as a 
regulatory objective. All industries evolve dynamically in response to the forces of 
technological, environmental and policy change.  For example, in the early stages of 
a network technology with large scale economy effects arising from high fixed and 
sunk costs, it may be necessary to restrict competition to ensure that sufficient 
investment is made by a single firm, and scale economies are achieved.  However, 
when the technology is more mature and widely diffused, and where technological 
change alters the cost structure, efficiency gains may be achieved by removing 
competitive restrictions and mandating structural changes (e.g. access regulation).  
Efficient regulation must be responsive to the need for these structural adjustments. 
 
Consequently, ex-ante specification of a single specific and enduring „sustainable 
industry structure‟ is likely to be harmful to the long-run sustainability of the industry.  
The risk exists that the industry becomes dependent for its survival upon externally-
imposed forces (e.g. subsidies and regulatory protections) rather than its own 
internal resources and internally-generated responses to external stresses (such as 
technological change).   
 
In a sustainable industry, new providers and/or new products will emerge where 
there is a reasonable expectation of customer demand sufficient to support profitable 
provision. Operational inefficiency, uncompetitive offerings, mismatch between 
products and consumer demand, or failure to adapt will lead to either industry exit 
(either product or participant) or reorganisation of the relationships between 
transacting parties in order increase efficiency.  Whilst some structural changes may 
be motivated by welfare-reducing opportunistic objectives (e.g. mergers to acquire or 
maintain dominance, or vertical integration to enable discrimination), and antitrust 
action or regulatory intervention may be appropriate to prevent welfare-reducing 
consequences, regulated structural impositions may also impede the ability to 
achieve a fair return from investments
28
.  Without the expectation of reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                              
into firms and markets, and the nature of the agreements via which all parties transact, both within and 
between individual entities.  
28
 For a discussion of the ways in which access regulation and structural separation may impede the pursuit 
of economic efficiency, see  
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returns, ongoing investment is not forthcoming and the industry becomes financially 
unsustainable
29
.  Changes to industry structure in response to environmental 
changes are thus an important component of the competitive process. It is only 
under circumstances conducive to entry, exit and internal structural reorganisation 
that efficient investment is likely to take place. 
 
As such dynamic behaviour is driven by the overarching objectives of both 
consumers and producers to increase their own individual welfare, and it is the 
objective of social planner to maximise the total long term welfare generated by the 
industry, this objective is best served by the alignment of interests towards the 
sustainability of the industry (including enabling its transformation or even extinction 
if that is the most economically efficient outcome). 
 
This leads us to the view that 
 
(b) Of the seven policy principles articulated, the modified principle (v) 
ensuring a sustainable industry should be the goal for both the industry 
and the regulatory policies governing it. 
 
The remaining six articulated objectives should not be seen as independent or 
equally weighted.  Rather, they serve as interdependent means by which regulation 
may support the overarching goal.  They are means towards the end, or as proxies 
that may be useful when expressed as partial objectives.  However, they are not 
mutually consistent: it may be necessary to trade off the benefit of pursuing one to 
enhance the pursuit of another, depending upon the prevailing circumstances.  The 
way these tradeoffs are made will not be fixed.  The guiding principle in making 
these tradeoffs must always be such that the greatest gains in economic efficiency 
are achieved. 
 
To that end, it is our view that the six principles fall naturally into a group of three 
sub-goals, which address particular activities that can be observed in the interactions 
amongst participants in the industry, a definition of the criteria justifying regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                              
Howell, B. (2009).  Separating New Zealand’s incumbent provider: a political economy analysis.  Paper 
presented at the International Telecommunications Society Regional Conference, Perth, Australia, August    
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f503,14751/14751_Political_Economy_of_Separation_BHowell_April09.pdf and 
Heatley, D., & Howell, B. (2010). Price discrimination, structural separation and the diffusion of fibre 
broadband: policy implications for Australia and New Zealand.  Paper presented at the 1
st
 Asia-Pacific 
Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, August 26-28, Wellington, New 
Zealand, respectively.  
29
 For example, a firm bound to provide universal service prices but facing selective competition only in 
low-cost markets must be subsidised or will withdraw from the market (e.g. by opting not to maintain 
infrastructure in the high-cost areas) as a consequence of being unable to continue offering services below 
cost in the uncompetitive high-cost markets. 
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intervention, and two constraints upon that intervention process, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
(v) ensuring a 
sustainable industry
 
(iii) allowing consumer 
choice between 
technology platforms
 
(ii) incentivising efficient 
investment in 
infrastructure
 
(i) promotion of 
competition
 
(vii) regulate if clear 
evidence of market 
inefficiencies 
(and no effective non-
regulatory options) 
(iv) minimise 
compliance costs
 
(vi) provide sufficient 
certainty and minimise 
transition distruption
 
Sub-goals:
Goal:
Criteria for intervention:
Constraints on 
intervention:
 
Figure 3. Proposed structure for telecommunications policy principles 
 
This structure makes it clear that the sub-goals are subservient to the overall goal, 
and as such should not be pursued unilaterally
30
. By placing these sub-goals at the 
same level, the inherent trade-offs between them can be made more explicit. In a 
similar vein, the proposed structure reveals there may be trade-offs to be made 
between principles at the “constraints on intervention” level. 
 
(c) It is our view that that the principles should be ordered and structured 
under the sub-headings given in Figure 2. 
 
We note that the three sub-goals are not independent, so their pursuit is conditional 
on the extent that they further the goal of increased efficiency.   
 
                                                     
30
 For example, the promotion of competition is not unambiguously good: under some circumstances it may 
lead to inefficient duplication of infrastructure, which is at odds with (ii). 
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Sub-goal (i), the promotion of competition, is desirable only to the extent that it 
results in an increase in efficiency
31
. Whether or not the pursuit of „competition 
enhancing‟ policies such as access regulation and structural separation results in 
increased entry depends on a range of factors specific to the industry and 
competitive environment. For example, structural separation of freight railways has 
been problematic, in particular because of the strong economies of vertical 
integration
32
. Promotion of competition may also be inappropriate in some 
circumstances, for example when high fixed and sunk costs make it too risky for 
otherwise welfare-enhancing investment to occur, leading to inefficiently low levels of 
activity relative to that achievable when competitive entry is restricted.   
 
It is also important that, when it is deemed appropriate to promote competition, the 
form of competition promoted is that most compatible with the pursuit of greatest 
increased efficiency in the long run. „Competition‟ describes a dynamic process of 
interaction between industry participants.  This interaction can take on many forms 
that influence, and are influenced by, inter alia, individual objectives, cost structures, 
processes, the nature of products and services exchanged, technologies, 
information asymmetries and factors external to the industry. Industry structure and 
the form of competition observed are typically interdependent. Three forms of 
competition that have become commonplace in telecommunications industry as a 
consequence of the ways in which they lead to increased efficiency in certain 
circumstances are infrastructure competition, services competition and benchmarked 
competition
33
.   
 
Infrastructure competition
34
 is desirable where cost structures are such that more 
than one firm can invest in its own infrastructure serving the same customers. It can 
also occur when differentiated technologies compete for commercial superiority. 
Infrastructure competition is the norm in mobile telecommunications in developed 
countries, and is also common in transport, where, for example, road, rail and water-
                                                     
31
 Howell, B. (2010).  Politics and the pursuit of telecommunications sector efficiency.  Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 6(2): 253-76 
32
 Pitman, R. (2005). Structural Separation to Create Competition? The Case of Freight Railways. Review 
of Network Economics. 4 3. For a discussion of the structural separation of New Zealand railways between 
2004 and 2008 see Heatley, D. (2009). The history and future of New Zealand railways. ISCR Research 
Report. Retrieved October 9, 2010 from:  
http://www.iscr.co.nz/f511,14914/14914_The_history_and_future_of_rail_in_New_Zealand_RR_.pdf.  
33
 It is noted that other forms of competition are also possible – including „dominant firm, competitive 
fringe‟, and monopolistic competition, which takes account of product differentiation. Competitive 
disciplines can be strong in markets without large numbers of firms. Particularly for products and services 
with low marginal costs, competitive pressures can be fierce under oligopoly and monopolistic competition. 
A competitive fringe can keep a substantial check on the abuse of market power by a monopolist. The 
advantages of geographically-consistent pricing or the threat of entry can erode the pricing power of a local 
geographic monopoly. Assessment of the levels of actual competition in a market should be sensitive to 
these factors. 
34
 Also known as facilities or facilities-based competition. 
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based carriers may compete in the same market. It is also common for urban fixed 
broadband connections in many countries (e.g. US, most of Australia, parts of New 
Zealand, where cable and telephony-based networks compete).  Infrastructure 
competition increases welfare from both the effects it has upon productive and 
dynamic efficiency, notably increased consumer welfare that comes from the ability 
for consumers to enjoy the differentiated characteristics of (and applications 
supported by) the infrastructure best suited to their needs rather than the lower 
welfare achieved from purchase of the alternative
35
.  Promotion of infrastructure 
competition is thus consistent with sub-goal (iii) allowing consumer choice between 
technology platforms.  However, to the extent that it results in inefficiently „too many‟ 
infrastructures, it runs counter to the pursuit of sub-goal (ii).   
 
Services competition
36
 has been pursued where regulated access is provided to 
enable many firms to access services provided on a bottleneck infrastructure that 
cannot be efficiently duplicated (for example, as a consequence of high fixed and 
sunk costs leading to scale economies that lead to the lowest costs of production 
when only one firm serves the entire market). Services competition typically requires 
substantial regulatory restrictions on the owner of the bottleneck infrastructure. The 
New Zealand Telecommunications Act, in specifying regulated access to many 
elements of Telecom‟s infrastructure (e.g. the copper access network; some 
backhaul services) encourages the pursuit of services competition.  However, the 
pursuit of services competition may be at the expense of pursuit of sub-goals (ii) and 
(iii). The effects of access regulation in diminishing the incentives for investment in 
alternative competing infrastructures is well-documented
37
, leading to compromises 
in the pursuit of (ii) the incentivising of efficient investment in infrastructure.  By 
extension, this further compromises the pursuit of (iii) allowing consumer choice 
between technology platforms.  
 
Benchmarked competition can be used when firms with geographic monopolies 
compete, for example it is used in the regulation of electricity lines businesses in 
New Zealand.  
 
As the most appropriate form of competition to pursue depends upon the (volatile) 
characteristics of the specific markets under consideration, it is very unlikely that an 
unchanging one-size-fits-all approach to either the models used to assess 
performance or the trade-offs between the priorities given to the three sub-goals is 
appropriate.  
 
                                                     
35
 See Carlton & Perloff (2005) op. cit. , Chapter 7.  
36
 Or services-based competition. 
37
 Howell. B  (2009). Comments to the Federal Communications Commission in response to the broadband 
study conducted by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society. 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f542,15628/15628_Berkman_Report_Response_to_FCC.pdf  
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This leads us to conclude that, to improve clarity in the role of competition in the 
regulatory process, principle (i) is amended: 
 
(d) Principle (i) should read “promotion of appropriate forms of competition 
where this will result in a long-term benefit of end-users of 
telecommunications services within New Zealand”. 
 
When it is clear what form of competition best supports the pursuit of increased 
efficiency, it becomes self-evident how each of sub-goals (ii) and (iii) should be 
prioritised.    
 
We note at this point that the inconsistencies, confusions and contradictions 
identified in the „Implications‟ subsection of Part A appear to have arisen principally 
because of a lack of clarity in regard to the overarching policy justifications for the 
government‟s investment in the UFB in the first place.  This leads to confusion in the 
policy directions regarding the historic regulations already in place. It also leads to 
confusion about the role that Telecom, and other infrastructure providers, will play in 
its deployment.  Has the government invested in the UFB to provide infrastructure 
competition for Telecom?  In that case, the direction for regulatory policy should 
clearly be a full reassessment of all regulations predicated on the pursuit of services 
competition (i.e. the removal of access regulation, for example as in the United 
States, at least in those areas where Telecom has NOT been selected as the 
investment partner). If the investment is in lieu of Telecom‟s or any other retail 
entrant‟s own investment in a successor FTTH  network, then the appropriate policy 
direction should be a suspension of the pursuit of all market-based competition (and 
the associated regulation facilitating pursuit of competition) whilst a succession plan 
is devised to migrate all existing customers using Telecom‟s network to the UFB (e.g. 
as has been signalled will occur in Australia, with the heads of agreement between 
NBNCo and Telstra to jointly manage the migration of customers to the fibre 
network).   
 
We note also that in the absence of any clearly articulated competition policy for the 
government‟s investment (i.e. is it in the pursuit of infrastructure- or services-based 
competition?), the position of firms that have already invested in competing local 
infrastructures (e.g. TelstraClear – cable; CityLink – fibre) is somewhat anomalous.  
Will they still be competing with both Telecom and the UFB as they compete with 
each other? Or will they be competing only with a combined Telecom/UFB, where 
their existing investments may potentially become stranded if they are unable to 
compete with a dominant, government-subsidised provider?   What is their role going 
forward in a competitive landscape that is predicated on the assumption of UFB 
dominance? 
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These questions lead us to consideration of the criteria for intervention in Figure 2:   
principle (vii), that regulation should only be introduced where there is clear evidence 
of market inefficiencies.  Whilst the original articulation was intervention in the case 
of “market failure”, the preceding discussion highlights that the sources of 
inefficiencies in the market may be other factors, such as policy interventions, the 
consequences of ill-targeted regulation or simply environmental changes that render 
past arrangements less efficient than they could be.  Rather than the use of a 
pejorative term such as „market failure‟ implying that actions on the part of only one 
subsystem of the complex interactive system outlined in Figure 1 in Part A is subject 
to scrutiny as the source of the observed inefficiencies, we instead suggest that a 
more wide-reaching criterion based upon performance measures („market 
inefficiencies‟) rather than structural foci („market failure‟) may more constructively 
align regulatory intervention with its overarching efficiency objectives. Taken within 
the systemic context outlined part A, it leaves open the avenue for considering that 
the inefficiencies may derive from other parts of the wider system rather than only 
within the „market‟.  
 
Thus: 
 
(e) It is our view that principle (vii) should be amended to read „regulate if 
clear evidence of market efficiencies (and no effective non-regulatory 
options)‟.  
 
We note that the remaining articulated principles act primarily as constraints on the 
form of regulatory intervention adopted: (iv) that the interventions adopted should 
minimise compliance costs and (v) provide sufficient certainty and minimise 
transition disruption.  As guiding principles, they are broadly consistent with the 
pursuit of increased economic efficiency.  However, in light of the preceding 
discussions, the provision of certainty is consistent with the overarching efficiency 
objective only to the extent that the provision of certainty is offered only in regard to 
those factors over which it is reasonable and credible for the regulator to offer 
certainty.   There may be trade-offs where the regulated provision of certainty 
impedes the ability of the market to evolve efficiently in response to events outside 
the control of either the market participants or the regulator.   
 
To the extent that these types of trade-offs are important in the pursuit of increased 
economic efficiency, we propose that three further explicit constraints should be 
placed on regulation.  Firstly, regulation should be forward-looking. It should not 
seek to remedy past injustices or inefficiencies. Rather it should anticipate 
environmental changes and to the extent possible, be appropriate under the most 
probable scenarios. Secondly regulation should be removed or revised if there are 
substantive changes to the „clear evidence of market inefficiencies‟ and/or the lack of 
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„effective non-regulatory options‟ that led to its imposition. And thirdly it should be 
explicit that the target of regulation is the efficient functioning of markets, rather than 
of specific firms.  
 
(f) We suggest adding three further principles under the subheading 
“Constraints on intervention”: 
(viii) regulation should be forward-looking; 
(ix) regulation should evolve – it should be subject to regular review, 
and be revised or amended in response to substantive changes in 
the conditions or assumptions on which is was based; 
(x) the target of regulation should be markets not firms – in particular, 
firms in a similar situation should be regulated on an equivalent 
basis. 
 
Lastly we note that the test for market inefficiencies cannot be applied without a 
clear specification of the market which is believed to embody inefficiencies.  
 
An industry is the aggregation of many „markets‟ for the provision of goods and 
services.  The term „market‟ is defined in the Commerce Act as a: „market in New 
Zealand for goods or services as well as other goods and services that, as a matter 
of fact and commercial common sense, are substitutable for them.‟ The Commerce 
Commission identifies five specific dimensions of market definition (Figure 4) and we 
can apply these dimensions in determining the boundaries of a „market‟. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Dimensions of a market38 
 
The functional level refers to its position in the vertical chain of production or 
distribution: wholesale or retail. At the retail market level, we contend that there are 
                                                     
38
 Commerce Commission (2005). Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines. p.14. Retrieved September 21, 
2010 from: http://www.comcom.govt.nz/assets/Imported-from-old-
site/BusinessCompetition/MergersAcquisitions/ClearanceProcessGuidelines/ContentFiles/Documents/Mer
gersandAcquisitionsGuidelines.pdf.  
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essentially only two relevant telecommunications network products purchased by the 
majority of customers: 
 Narrowband services (voice, fax, dial-up internet, SMS – purchased via a 
monthly account or prepay arrangement for either fixed line or mobile access) 
 Broadband data. 
 
These products are not unique to any technology. While a proportion of customers 
may have a specific requirement that determines a particular network technology is 
the only feasible one to purchase (e.g. mobile capability; very high speed 
requirements), competitive forces have succeeded in ensuring that every network 
technology now strives to emulate key features of its competitors‟ product, with the 
aim of being an effective substitute (from the perspective of a majority of customers). 
 
For example, voice calls have been traditionally supplied using POTS. These can be 
supplied over copper twisted pair, HFC, or (utilising an appropriate adaptor) over 
fibre and satellite connections. Non-POTS voice calls can be supplied using mobile 
technologies (2G or 3G) or using VoIP over broadband connections (which 
themselves could be based on DSL, HFC, fibre, 3G, 4G or satellite). A market 
definition for voice calls that (explicitly or implicitly) restricted the market to a single 
technology would do so only because the product definition was so tightly specified 
as to exclude the range of network choices available that can act as partial or near 
complete substitutes, if not strictly homogeneous alternatives.  
 
Technological change has resulted in an overwhelming trend for narrowband 
services to be delivered over the top (OTT) of IP-based broadband. Voice over IP is 
just one example of this trend. The narrowband share of the market is falling, and 
regulatory policy should anticipate the rapid future substitution of narrowband 
services with OTT delivery of the vast majority of services previously offered over 
narrowband via broadband data services. 
 
The geographic extent of the market concerns the geographic area over which 
transactions between competing suppliers and buyers take place. The cost 
structures for telecommunications infrastructure define three broad geographic 
zones: 
 An “urban” zone, in which it is commercially feasible to have two or more 
competing infrastructures. 
 A “rural” zone, in which one infrastructure operator can make a commercial 
return, but two operators would be commercially unsustainable. 
 A “remote” zone, in which the provision of infrastructure is not commercially 
sustainable 
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Given current cost structures, it is not implausible even in the New Zealand context 
that the most efficient telecommunications industry could be based upon 
infrastructure competition between vertically integrated firms in the urban zone, 
services or benchmarked competition in the rural zone, and tendering for the market 
in the remote zone
39
. It is recognised that different technologies have different 
characteristics, thus zone boundaries defined in terms of a specific technology will 
differ from those of another specific technology. However, the complexities of 
individual technologies are to a large extent abstracted away if instead of an 
infrastructure-based view of product market definitions (copper, fibre, mobile), the 
market definition is instead cast as the purchase of a broadband connection of a 
given set of specifications, regardless of the infrastructure over which it is delivered.  
 
Policy and regulatory choices in New Zealand have led (or will shortly lead) to 
substantially different competitive conditions for fixed line provision in different 
geographic regions. Table 1 identifies geographic regions that are defined by the 
outcomes of specific UFB and RBI policy initiatives. Depending on the outcomes of 
these policy processes, there could be as few as five or as many as seven 
geographic markets in which there will be between one and three fixed-line 
infrastructure providers.  
 
Competition is further enhanced the widespread availability of mobile voice and data 
services. The Telecom and Vodafone 3G networks cover approximately 97% of the 
population, and the 2degrees 3G network covers most of Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch and Queenstown. Telecom offers 21Mbs (peak) download speeds 
using HSPA+ but, sensibly, tells people to expect real-life download speeds of 
around 4Mbps. Vodafone are expected to roll out a HSPA+ upgrade by the end of 
2010. 
 
Table 1 highlights the fact that on the basis of such market definitions, there will be a 
range of broadband markets across new Zealand with very different structural and 
economic characteristics.  The implication is that in order to maintain consistency 
with the regulatory principles articulated above, it will no longer be appropriate to 
maintain a single set of regulatory arrangements across the entire country.  The 
appropriate efficiency-raising regulations for one market (e.g. GM1, where 
infrastructure competition is substantial) may be totally inappropriate in another (e.g. 
GM7a, where there will only be one provider, and even then the service may be 
provided only because of the application of an explicit subsidy).   
 
                                                     
39
 See, for example, Levin (2010) op. cit.  
The very fact that infrastructure competition has emerged in a number of urban geographic locations 
confirms this hypothesis.   
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This stands as further evidence in support of our contention that the regulatory 
review currently being undertaken cannot be carried out in isolation from either the 
UFB or RBI policies.   
 
Table 1. Potential geographic regions for fixed-line infrastructure supply as at 9 October 2010. 
Geographic 
market 
Geography as defined by policy 
and regulatory choices 
Fixed-line 
infrastructure 
competitors 
Approx % 
of 
consumers 
GM1 Wellington, Kapiti, Christchurch 
Assuming successful Telecom UFB 
bid 
TelstraClear 
Telecom 
0-11% 
GM2 Wellington, Kapiti, Christchurch 
Assuming unsuccessful Telecom 
UFB bid 
TelstraClear 
Telecom 
RFG 
business
40
 
0-11% 
GM3 Timaru, Whangarei and Central North 
Island 
Telecom 
RFG 
businesses 
12% 
GM4 Other UFB areas 
Where Telecom is unsuccessful 
bidder 
Telecom 
RFG business 
0-52% 
GM5 Other UFB areas 
Where Telecom is successful bidder 
Telecom 0-52% 
GM6 Non-UFB areas covered by Telecom 
cabinetisation programme 
Telecom 9% 
GM7a Areas covered by Rural Broadband 
Initiative 
If Telecom is successful tenderer 
Telecom 0 or 13% 
GM7b Areas covered by Rural Broadband 
Initiative if Telecom is unsuccessful 
tenderer 
Telecom 
Successful 
bidder
41
 
0 or 13% 
GM8 Unsuitable for fixed-line services - ~3% 
 
 
1.3 Relationship with regulatory regime for UFB networks  
 
(13) The Ministry considers regulatory consistency across the fibre and copper 
access networks to be important. 
 
As we have articulated above, „regulatory consistency‟ across the two access 
networks matters not inasmuch as there are two networks of differing technological 
                                                     
40
 Member of the Regional Fibre Group. See: http://www.nzrfg.co.nz/.  
41
 While the RBI requires connection of schools to fibre, the tender allows technological flexibility for 
connections to homes and businesses. While Telecom may prefer to maximise the use of its existing fixed 
lines assets, it is likely that an alternative bidder would make extensive use of wireless technologies. 
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foundations to be regulated, but that increasingly the market(s) of interest are those 
relating to access to broadband services, regardless of the technologies over which 
those services are delivered.  In order to maintain a consistent set of incentives that 
lead to the operation of a sustainable industry, with markets individually operating as 
efficiently as possible, and to the extent that regulation is required to enable that to 
occur, then it is imperative that there be a single policy and regulatory view across all 
access networks over which broadband access services are provided. Failure to do 
so will inevitably result in inconsistencies and regulatory arbitrage opportunities 
between the networks that will undoubtedly lead to a less efficient and less 
sustainable industry.  
 
Paragraph 13‟s subsequent focus on regulatory consistency viewed as promotion of 
competition through open access, but the use of different tools (regulatory 
forbearance in a nascent network, separation of retail from network and wholesale 
operations) within the frame of the promotion of competition serves to confirm our 
earlier observation that a focus upon artefacts such as industry structure and sub-
goals such as the promotion of competition might lead to the means of promoting 
economic efficiency becoming conflated with the pursuit of the end of an efficient 
and sustainable industry.   We note that „regulatory consistency‟ should not be 
interpreted as the consistent use of the same regulatory tools or sub-goal objectives 
and priorities, but rather as the consistent application of the regulatory principles 
within the framework proposed in Figure 2
42
.   
 
2. Overview  
 (15) … Structural separation would not affect the underlying problem of limited 
competition at the network level, which confers market power on the network owner. 
Regulation is likely to remain necessary to avoid monopoly pricing, unless 
competition from alternative networks emerges. 
 
As discussed above, there is already substantial competition for all services supplied 
via the copper network in a number of geographical markets.  Both the number of 
geographic markets where competitive intensity can reasonably be forecast to 
increase substantially in the near future is significant. 
 
Paragraph 15 serves rather to reinforce our earlier observation that the relevant 
question challenging the regulatory regime is not Telecom‟s structural separation, 
                                                     
42
 We note with some irony that at a time of technological convergence, and thus increased competition 
between technology platforms, the New Zealand policy and regulatory approach appears to be fragmenting 
towards separate rules and processes governing the operation of individual network platforms.   
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but the challenge posed by infrastructure competition that is both developing 
naturally and being imposed as a consequence of UFB policy decisions.  
 
 
3. The current regulatory framework for copper services  
 
 
The LOI policy approach is predicated on the absence of infrastructure 
competition and the existence of bottleneck infrastructure.  It aims to incentivise 
the bottleneck owner‟s competitors to invest in successively more elements of 
network infrastructure („climbing the ladder‟) to the extent that they ultimately own 
sufficient network elements to become full infrastructure competitors. It has been 
suggested as a means by which (the more desirable) infrastructure competition 
can emerge as a consequence of judicious application of access regulation43. 
 
There is scant evidence of the ladder working in practice44.  In the New Zealand 
context, the firms most aggressively investing via local loop unbundling 
provisions were already extensive infrastructure owners before the opportunity to 
invest in elements of the copper network were made available (Vodafone, 
TelstraClear, Kordia/Orcon).  Local loop unbundling has been used largely as a 
means of enabling these existing infrastructure owners to enter into new market 
segments that were largely complementary to their existing network investments 
(for example, different geographic segments where they had no local access 
network – TelstraClear; across the boundary from mobile to fixed line access – 
Vodafone; or „back a rung down the ladder‟ from backhaul into retail operations – 
Kordia via its purchase of Orcon).   The effect in the market has been the use of 
LLU to enable these competitors to differentiate their multi-product bundles from 
those of Telecom or as a lower-cost option to deploying more of their own 
technology (e.g. TelstraClear).  
 
The „failure‟ of the „ladder‟ model highlights further fundamental inconsistencies 
between the regulations governing the copper network and the UFB that lead to 
some very perverse consequences.   
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Assuming that the „ladder‟ model was appropriate when adopted in 2006 
because there truly was a bottleneck infrastructure at that date, and that it was in 
fact able to encourage entrants to „climb‟ from retail operations to full network 
ownership, then they would be fully integrated operators.  As fibre is the frontier 
technology, then it is likely that rather than building a new copper access network 
a successful „ladder climber‟ would invest in a fibre network.  As the UFB is 
providing that network, climbers do not need to invest any more in either copper 
assets or a fibre network.  Their capital would potentially be available for 
investment in the UFB.  However, as existing retail operators, they are in effect 
unable to take a controlling interest in a UFB.  There is no longer a case for them 
to invest any more in the industry at all.  It is notable that none of the 
predominant unbundling entrants have engaged in the UFB tendering project as 
capital investors.   
 
Moreover, if the effect of the UFB policy is to impose infrastructure competition 
without the need for Telecom‟s competitors to „climb the ladder‟, it begs the 
question whether the „ladder‟ has any further relevance in the New Zealand 
regulatory environment.  If unbundling entrants can obtain (presumably superior, 
frontier – and subsidised) UFB products under open access arrangements, why 
would they continue to invest in a legacy network of inferior quality?   Indeed, 
why also would Telecom continue to invest?  Where the UFB is not deployed, 
and where it is uneconomic for there to be more than one network, then the 
„ladder‟ would never have led to substantial competitor investment in the first 
place.  In these uneconomic areas, even Telecom might need to receive 
subsidies to maintain a basic level of service (e.g. under the RBI).  The leaves 
only the remaining areas where there is no UFB, where it might be desirable for 
„ladder‟ type investment to occur. But these areas have not yet been opened up 
for unbundling.   There may still continue to be a case for a ladder in these areas, 
but they comprise a very small share of the customer market – perhaps around 9% 
(Table 1).  
 
The perversities also draw into attention the need to maintain the subsidiary 
regulatory tool of functional separation of Telecom‟s copper network.  The „ladder‟ 
builds upon the tool of access regulation.  If the „ladder‟ is no longer useful, at 
least in those markets where infrastructure competition exists, and the purpose of 
the UFB was to create such infrastructure competition then what is the purpose 
of maintaining regulated access regulation, functional separation and 
equivalence provisions?  It would be expected that the nature of the relationships 
between Telecom and its LLU customers may change under infrastructure 
competition from being competitors on the copper platform to allies seeking to 
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develop a common set of network management arrangements enabling vigorous 
competition between the network platforms.  At the very least, such co-operation 
would be expected to mitigate the risk of their existing assets becoming stranded. 
In order to maintain the dynamic incentives to invest in improved capabilities on 
the copper network to facilitate aggressive infrastructure competition across time, 
absent separation mandates, it might be expected that either contractual or 
ownership alliances would develop to finance network enhancements45.  Yet 
separation mandates preclude such dynamic efficiency-raising activities from 
occurring.  Ipso facto, if access regulation and the ladder of investment are no 
longer appropriate for pursuing the regulatory goals of an efficient and 
sustainable industry, then neither is separation – either functional or structural – 
appropriate.   
 
Such reasoning leads back again to the lack of clarity about the competition 
policy and objectives surrounding the UFB.  Telecom‟s voluntary separation 
response is not what would normally be expected in a regulatory environment 
aligned with the pursuit of efficient infrastructure competition.  It can be viewed as 
symptomatic of a response to a policy that is itself not clearly aligned with an 
overall efficiency-raising objective.  The structural separation response must be 
seen as an example of where policy and regulatory interventions will necessarily 
alter industry interactions, but that the result may not be aligned with the 
overarching principles of efficient and appropriate regulation, especially if the 
policies themselves have not been adequately assessed under principles of the 
type articulated in section 1 above.    
 
 
4.1 The implications of structural separation  
 
 
It is our view that cost-based prices will generally be more consistent with the 
pursuit of efficient outcomes – but only to the extent that all relevant costs and 
risks are factored into the consideration.  Thus, the prices must be forward-
looking.   
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Prices must also take into account the fact that there is both foreseeable and 
unforeseeable risk associated with network investments.  Whilst the costs of 
foreseeable risks are most efficiently allocated to the party whose decisions lead 
to them being invoked, it is rarely most efficient for the unforeseeable risks to be 
borne by one party alone without adequate compensation being paid for these to 
be borne.   Unless the costs of the unforeseeable risks are efficiently allocated or 
compensated, then policy sub-goal (ii) encouraging efficient investment will be 
unlikely to be satisfied.   
  
 
4.4 The appropriate form of cost-based bitstream pricing  
 
 
 
Under the assumption of infrastructure competition, and the ongoing need for 
investment in the copper network, it is our view (see section 3 above) that this 
objective will be best achieved by the removal of both access regulation and 
functional separation obligations precluding the ability of investors in the copper 
network to bargain freely in order to develop the optimal set of strategies via 
which the copper network can compete with its network rivals.  
 
To the extent that there is any need for concerns about price relativity in an 
environment characterised by network competition, it is the relativities between 
the provision of equivalent services on the different platforms.  Normal 
competitive interaction in unrestricted markets where there is infrastructure 
competition will generally render any intervention unnecessary, as the relativities 
will be determined by the underlying cost structures of each network.  However, it 
is noted that government subsidies applied to the UFB mean that the prices on 
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this network will not be truly cost-driven.  In order to maintain relativities so that 
both platforms can continue to face equalised incentives, it is the prices of the 
UFB network that must be regulated to prevent the occurrence of unproductive 
arbitrage between the networks.   
 
In respect of regulatory arbitrage, we raise our concerns about the interplay that 
will likely occur as a consequence of structural and functional separation 
obligations on both the copper and fibre networks.  Retailers with limited 
investment in any network face the greatest incentives to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage as they do not bear the risks of their decisions to switch between 
networks.  As UFB policies limit the ability of retailers to invest in the fibre 
networks, and the „ladder of investment‟ has failed to elicit substantial new 
investment in the copper network, then the risks of regulatory arbitrage occurring  
under the currently proposed arrangements seem substantial. The way in which 
a regulator must respond is crucially dependent upon the overriding objective of 
the government‟s investment in the UFB.  If the objective is to stimulate 
infrastructure competition, then the appropriate response would appear to be at 
the very least a dismantling of the non-discrimination provisions on the copper 
network, and prices that ensure that the balance between networks is maintained 
so that the subsidised one is not artificially advantaged.  If instead the objective is 
to rapidly replace the copper network, then relativity is irrelevant – the prices on 
both the copper and fibre networks must be structured to crowd out all future 
development of the copper network in favour of a mass migration to the UFB.   
 
4.5 Averaged or de-averaged cost-based prices
46
  
 
 
 
Geographically averaged prices are fundamentally incompatible with the pursuit 
of infrastructure competition without substantial intervention to correct for the 
distortions in incentives to competitive entry decisions that they invoke.  The 
question of the relevance of de-averaged prices with a structurally separate 
Telecom ultimately rests with a policy decision on universal service-based retail 
pricing of the UFB proposal, and how this flows through to wholesale pricing 
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principles.  The UFB policy requires averaged wholesale prices within a 
geographic region, but makes no assumptions with regard to averaging between 
regions.  Indeed, the assumption that there will be up to 33 separate regions 
operated by different firms, and that national averaging would require transfers 
between them, tends to suggest that there will be no national averaging of UFB 
wholesale prices.  
 
It is noted that to date, all network operators have offered nationwide retail 
telephony and broadband pricing despite facing different costs. For mobile 
networks, this has occurred as a consequence of competitive interaction and the 
imposition of the TSO.  In respect of fixed lines, only Telecom has been bound by 
regulation to provide such retail pricing.  Any compensation for unmet costs 
borne by Telecom as a consequence of „cherry picking‟ by its competitors into 
low-cost areas has historically been addressed by the TSO – in respect of 
customer losses to both mobile and fixed line competitors.   
 
If relativities between copper and UFB pricing are to be maintained (4.4. above), 
then the geographic pricing policy must be common across the networks.  If they 
are not, then there will be different arbitrage opportunities in different geographic 
locations depending upon which set of rules applies to each network, leading to 
an eventual bifurcation of network provision across the country. Specifically, the 
network with de-averaged prices will be unable to compete in the rural areas, as 
its costs will be unsubsidised, whereas in the urban areas, the network with 
averaged prices will be unable to compete, as its costs must be artificially inflated 
to create the subsidies applied to the rural areas.   The ultimate result is that 
infrastructure competition will be eliminated – the de-averaged network will 
become the sole network in the urban areas and the averaged one the sole 
network in the rural ones.  That is, there will be a return to local geographic 
monopolies based upon a single technology. As the objective of averaged prices 
in the first place is to enable a nationally consistent set of retail prices (essentially 
a „universal service price‟) then even this objective fail, as the prices for each 
region will, under these facts, become locally cost-based.  Both consumer choice 
and efficiencies from infrastructure competition will be lost.  
 
Given the foregoing assumptions about the likely de-averaged national UFB 
wholesale prices, it appears that the only logical option is to proceed with de-
averaged prices on the copper network.  For consistency, and because the costs 
in each UFB region are likely to be different, this suggests that for ease of 
assessment of market performance and promotion of competition, it would be 
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appropriate to align the boundaries for copper de-averaging with those of the 
UFB.  
 
6. Local Service TSO  
 
6.1 The current TSO framework  
 
The current TSO imposes obligations upon Telecom in respect of: 
i geographically averaged („universal service‟) retail prices; 
ii unmetered local calling for residential consumers; 
iii a cap on the rental price for a residential connection, based on the price 
prevailing upon privatisation in 1990; and 
iv service quality.  
 
The current obligations relate purely to the provision of historic narrow-band services 
offered over the fixed line PSTN, but make no stipulation about the type of network 
over which those services must be provided.  The list of services which must be 
supplied, in particular the requirement for provision of fax and dial-up internet 
services, takes little cognisance of the extent to which convergence to a common 
digital format has enabled the functionality offered by the historic services to be 
delivered by many different technologies, including those already offered by 
Telecom‟s existing infrastructure competitors. 
 
Until the recent (2010) review of the TSO, even though Telecom bore the obligations 
at the retail level, the costs of meeting them were shared across the industry.   The 
current proposals oblige Telecom alone to meet these costs
47
.   
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To the extent that structural separation requires a view as to how the existing TSO 
obligations should be divided between the different residual operations, we will 
address items i to iii above.  We are not qualified to comment on issue iv, as it 
pertains to question 24.    
 
1. If the purpose of structural separation is to create a Telecom retail operation 
that is directly equivalent to any other retail operator, there seems little point 
in retaining retail price controls on Telecom, but not its (otherwise equivalent) 
retail competitors, as competitive processes will achieve the equivalent 
outcome more efficiently. Arguably, the same observation could be made 
under functional separation alone. 
 
2. The „unmetered local calling‟ obligation has been adopted by all of Telecom‟s 
fixed line competitors, yet only Telecom is bound to supply it.  There is no 
apparent reason why one (separated) retail firm should have this obligation 
but not the others.  Either all retailers must be bound by the regulation, or 
none of them.  If the tariff is provided because it meets market demands for it, 
then no regulation is necessary to maintain it.  Again competitive pressures 
will ensure its ongoing supply.  
 
3. The remaining issue is the extent to which the costs of meeting the universal 
service price obligation are allocated. For a single, nationwide integrated 
network facing no competition, it is straightforward to „average‟ retail prices to 
recover wholesale and network operation costs.  Aside from the challenges of 
infrastructure competition (see section 4.5 above), separation drives a wedge 
between the locus of costs and the risks associated with them.  The vast 
majority of the costs of a telecommunications operation reside in the network.  
By comparison, retail costs are small.  If the universal service prices are 
imposed at the retail level, then in order for them to be passed to the network 
operator, wholesale prices must also be universal.  This implies that the 
universal service obligation is rightly a network, rather than a retail, obligation.  
If the network operator is the sole supplier of connections to all (equalised) 
retailers, then transfers can be made internally so that the receipts from low-
cost customers can be applied to cover the costs of supplying high-cost 
connections below cost.   
 
6.8 Funding the Local Service TSO obligations  
 
The „problem‟, however, arises precisely because the copper network does face 
competition from other platforms – as has been evidenced in the problems 
associated with reconciling the TSO costs between network operators without unduly 
distorting the incentives for competitive entry.   
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As universal service pricing is a retail instrument effecting a wealth transfer from 
urban customers to rural ones, if it is allocated asymmetrically across retailers, there 
will inevitably be adverse selection (“cream-skimming” or “cherry-picking”) 
consequences that play out at the network level. If only one retailer must charge the 
equalised prices, then competitors with their own infrastructures and without an 
averaging obligation will enter only in low-cost segments and price to undercut the 
retailer who must subsidise customers in high-cost segments. If the entrant‟s costs 
are indeed higher than the regulated retailer, then inefficient entry may occur.  The 
regulated retailer, as the one of last resort, will be left with a disproportionate share 
of high-cost customers, and becomes economically unviable.  These issues play out 
not just in respect of geographic cost elements, but also in relation to arbitrage 
between customer segments with different underlying cost structures – for example, 
between residential and commercial customers, or between high volume and low 
volume customers
48
. 
 
 
 
 
It is our view that there is no simple way of addressing these issues as long as there 
is an expectation that selected firms within a competitive market are obligated to 
carry out socially-motivated wealth transfers but others are not.  Either the social 
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obligation becomes a charge on all firms equally, or another means is found to effect 
the wealth transfer.   
 
We note at this point that a continuing obligation upon the copper network operator 
to be the connector of last resort imposes some especial stresses, Again, these 
stresses derive from the UFB, and the confusion over whether it is an infrastructure 
competitor or the direct successor to the copper network. As the separated network 
operator cannot have a direct relationship with retail customers, and the presumption 
is that competition is to prevail and is restricted by competition law in its ability to 
form relationships with fibre operators to progress, it is likely to be unable to easily 
exit from the market when it is economically efficient for it to do so.  Ultimately, it is 
the consumer‟s decision to switch from copper to fibre network connection.  Retailers 
with no vested financial interest in either network face no special incentives to 
influence consumer decisions.  As long as the copper operator as the connector of 
last resort is obligated to offer connections, a small number of consumers (and 
retailers for whom these customers are profitable) can force the copper operator to 
continue providing services, up to the point of financial insolvency, when an earlier 
exit would have been more efficient.  If financial insolvency of the copper operator is 
the trigger for revision of increased government subsidies to keep the copper 
network operating, the inefficiencies can persist for even longer.   
 
It is our view that the whole question the allocation of the obligations to be the 
provider of last resort – at both the network and retail level – must be revisited to 
take account of all of increasing competition, technological innovation and network 
evolution.   At the very least, it is becoming clearer that the changing face of 
competition across the country means that it is highly unlikely that one network or 
one retail firm will be able to meet such obligations and remain financially viable.  
Locally specific characteristics must be taken into account.  A single national policy 
is most unlikely to be optimal.  We contend the LFCs and the successful RBI 
tenderers, being the recipients of government subsidies, are more likely to be able to 
meet such obligations, so a succession plan to transfer these obligations should be 
considered as the new networks are rolled out.  
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Part C – Appendix 
 
Comments of previous regulatory interventions in the New 
Zealand fixed-line telecommunications market 
 
1. A universal service obligation equalising rural and urban residential telephone 
rentals, a cap on residential retail prices and a mandatory „free local calling‟ 
residential tariff, imposed in 1990 (the „Kiwi Share‟).  Whilst the free local 
calling and universal service obligations addressed largely historical allocative 
objectives, the cap on residential retail prices addressed efficiency by 
restricting the extent to which the firm could exert its market power by charging 
over-high prices to its retail customers. The costs of providing universal service 
and free local calling were recovered initially via interconnection prices charged 
to competitors and after 2001 from a tax levied annually on industry 
participants (the Telecommunications Service Order or TSO).   
 
2. Access regulation and regulated interconnection to the fixed line network, 
imposed in 2001,   The efficiency justification for regulated interconnection 
prices was on the basis of a static efficiency analysis  that interconnection 
prices charged to competitors were above cost. Access to specified fixed line 
network products at regulated prices was justified on static and dynamic 
efficiency grounds of gains from increased competition in non-network 
elements of services provided by Telecom to its customers and access to a 
range of products and services not offered by Telecom.  
 
3. Bitstream unbundling, imposed in 2003 following an economic efficiency 
analysis, as a compromise enabling increased dynamic efficiency by increasing 
competition in downstream broadband services whilst simultaneously 
preserving the incentives for Telecom to invest in a replacement „Next 
Generation Network‟ based upon the provision of fibre-optic cables to roadside 
cabinets.     
 
4. Full local loop unbundling (LLU), imposed in 2006.  No economic efficiency 
argument was offered to support this regulatory intervention.  Unquantified 
justifications included increasing broadband penetration and investment in the 
telecommunications market as a consequence of competitors investing in 
equipment installed in Telecom‟s network.   
 
5. Functional separation, imposed in 2007, separating Telecom New Zealand into 
a network operation arm (Chorus), a wholesale operation (Telecom Wholesale) 
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and a retail operation (Telecom Retail).  Again, no efficiency justification was 
offered for this intervention. 
